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THE RIGHT TO SILENCE HELPS THE INNOCENT: A
RESPONSE TO CRITICS
Alex Stein*

ABSTRACT

This Article responds to the numerous critics of Daniel J
Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARv.
L. REV. 430 (2000). Under Seidmann and Stein's theory, the right to
silence protects innocents who find themselves unable to corroborate
their self-exoneratingaccounts by verifiable evidence. Absent the right,
guilty criminals would pool with innocents by making false selfexonerating statements. Factfinders would consequently discount the
probative value of all uncorroboratedexculpatory statements, at the
expense of those innocents who cannot corroboratetheir true accounts.
The right to silence minimizes this pooling effect, thereby reducing the
incidence of wrongful convictions, by providing guilty criminals an
attractive alternative to lying. Under Seidmann and Stein's theory,
innocents tell the truth, whereas criminals-fearfulof being implicated
by their lies and unwilling to confess-exercise the right to silence.
This separation reduces the distortion thatfactfinders would otherwise
commit by discounting the probabilityof true self-exonerating accounts.
The Article defends this theory against its critics on empirical and
methodological grounds, as well as by demonstrating that the antipooling rationale stands out as the only coherent and comprehensive
explanation of the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.

INTRODUCTION

This Article revisits Seidmann and Stein's rationalization of the
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right to silence' and responds to its critics. 2 Under Seidmann and
Stein's model (SSM), the right to silence protects innocents who find
themselves unable to corroborate their self-exonerating accounts by
verifiable evidence. Absent the right, guilty criminals would pool with
innocents by making false exculpatory statements (to the extent they
believe that their lies are unlikely to be exposed). Aware of this
incentive, factfinders would rationally discount the probative value of
all uncorroborated exculpatory statements, at the expense of the
unfortunate innocents who cannot corroborate their true exculpatory
stories. The right to silence minimizes this pooling effect, thereby
reducing the incidence of wrongful convictions, by providing guilty
criminals a strong incentive to separate from the pool. Specifically, it
provides guilty suspects and defendants an attractive alternative to
lying. Under SSM, innocents tell the truth, whereas criminals-fearful
of being implicated by their lies and unwilling to confess-exercise the
right to silence. This separation reduces the downscaling distortion that
factfinders would otherwise commit in evaluating the probability of
self-exonerating testimonies, which-unbeknownst to them-happen to
be true. The fix, admittedly, is incomplete, but is substantial enough to
justify the right to silence. The right to silence is as justified as any
other rule of criminal procedure and evidence that reduces the rate of
3
erroneous convictions by increasing the rate of erroneous acquittals.
I Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A GameTheoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430 (2000).
2 See Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, SILENCE AND FREEDOM 68-69 (2007); Samuel W. Buell,
Criminal Procedure within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1639 (2007); Mike Redmayne,
Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 21 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 209, 220-21
(2007); LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL
EPISTEMOLOGY 130 (2006); Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship
Reconsidered: Results of the InterdisciplinaryTurn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 1020-21 (2006); T.H.
Waters III, Between a Rock and a HardPlace:An Examination of a "Costly " Right to Silencefor
Corporate Employees in Criminal Investigations, 25 REV. LITIG. 603, 611-31 (2006); PAUL
ROBERTS & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 422-25 (2004); Ronald J. Allen & M.
Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and its Future Predicted,94 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 243, 265 n.104 (2004); Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps
Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 421 (2003); Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and
Acquitting the Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV.
925 (2002). Seidmann and Stein's rationalization of the right to silence also has supporters. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 715-16 (6th ed., 2003) (describing
Seidmann and Stein's theory as the most persuasive economic rationalization of the right to
silence); ANDREW ASHWORTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, SERIOUS CRIME AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21
(2002) ("The anti-pooling rationale differs from the others in that it is not grounded in deep
principle but rather in empirically testable assumptions about behaviour, related to one of the
primary purposes of criminal justice system (to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent). It
should therefore take its place alongside other instrumental rationales.").
3 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 433-34. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 618 n.2 (6th ed. 2003) (observing that "[t]rading off Type I and
Type II errors is a pervasive feature of evidence law"); ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE
LAW 172-78 (2005) ("The legal system can ... reduce the incidence of wrongful acquittals ('false
negatives') by increasing the number of wrongful convictions ('false positives'), and vice
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SSM is a crucial, but not the only, component of Seidmann and
Stein's theory. This theory has two additional components: doctrinal
fit4 and empirical support. 5 Seidmann and Stein's rationalization of the
right to silence provides a unified and coherent explanation to every
aspect of the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 6 Their theory thus has
four methodological virtues: parsimony, testability, coherence and
comprehensiveness. This theory is parsimonious in that it rests on a
very small number of assumptions about people's rationality; it is
testable as all of its predictions can be verified empirically; it is
internally coherent and unified; and, finally, it is comprehensive in its
explication of the relevant legal phenomena. No other rationale for the
right to silence exhibits a similar set of methodological virtues.
Moreover, SSM aligns with empirical studies carried out in England
after the abolition of the privilege against adverse inferences from the
defendant's silence, which took place in 1994. 7 Those studies confirm
the model's predictions concerning the effects of right's abolition.
Abolition of the right to silence would induce many criminals to lie
instead of confessing (unless society is willing to compromise its
sentencing goals by giving confessors substantial punishment
discounts).
Arguments raised by SSM's critics take two directions. Some of
those arguments challenge the model's economic rationality. They
claim that SSM fails to establish that the right to silence is or can be
welfare-enhancing. 8 Other arguments question SSM's foundational
assumption of rationality. Under SSM, the relevant actors always act
rationally (in a rudimentary sense). The model's critics call this
postulation into question. From their perspective, criminal suspects and
defendants are boundedly rational at best; and even if they were entirely
rational, their situation at interrogation and trial-a combination of fear,
pressures and anxiety--does not allow them to act rationally. The
critics' opposition to rationalism also influences their understanding of
factfinding. According to this understanding, factfinders follow their

versa.").
4 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 474-98.
5 Id. at 498-502.
6 Id. at 474-98.
7 The most important of those studies is TOM BUCKE, ROBERT STREET & DAVID BROWN,
THE RIGHT OF SILENCE: THE IMPACT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1994

(2000).
8 The relationship between the right to silence and social welfare is very complex. SSM
establishes that the right can be welfare-enhancing in a society that considers an erroneous
conviction and punishment of an innocent person more harmful than an erroneous exoneration of
a guilty criminal. This preference is not written on stone, see LAUDAN, supra note 2, at 130, but
is consensual. See STEIN, supra note 3, at 172-78. SSM assumes that jurors adopt this societal
preference. For variations, see Daniel J. Seidmann, The Effects of a Right to Silence, 72 REV.
ECON. STUD. 593 (2005).
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intuitions rather than general rationality and legal rules. They ignore
the Fifth Amendment's command by drawing adverse inferences
against non-testifying defendants. Drawing such natural inferencessay the critics-is a hard-wired instinct of human beings that the law
cannot undo. 9
The "realist" lines of critique against SSM have a common feature:
the critics' allusion to the "real facts" that are not in possession of
Seidmann and Stein. The critics claim that they know what's really
going on at interrogations and trials and how the system of criminal
justice really works. The critics juxtapose their realities against
Seidmann and Stein's theoretical model, which they portray as an unreal
post-hoc rationalization of the "law from the book" by abstract
economic principles.
The Article proceeds in the following order. Part I restates
Seidmann and Stein's rationalization of the right to silence. Part II
defends SSM's economic logic against the rationality-based critique.
Part III responds to the critics' "realism"-a combination of ruleskepticism and the critics' self-professed understandings of the selfincrimination doctrine. Part IV outlines SSM's rationalization of every
important component of the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence-a feature
that the model's critics uniformly failed to acknowledge. This doctrinal
fit establishes SSM's superiority over other attempts at explaining the
self-incrimination doctrine. A short conclusion follows.

I.

SSM

The right to silence plays no significant role in cases in which the
evidence inculpating the defendant is overwhelming. In such cases,
both guilty and innocent defendants face a serious prospect of
conviction, which the right to silence can neither attenuate nor increase.
For a defendant who faces overwhelming evidence of guilt, entering
into a guilty plea, bargained or unilateral, would normally be the best
strategy.
The right to silence also plays no significant role in cases in which
the evidence inculpating the defendant is weak. Defendants facing
weak inculpatory evidence-both guilty and innocent-will likely be
Testifying and telling the truth will be an innocent
exonerated.
defendant's best strategy irrespective of whether the legal system
9 See Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 942-43. Compare Redmayne, supra note 2, at 220, who
estimates that factfinders can consider any evidence and adequately determine the probability of
the defendant's guilt even when the pooling is present. He observes that "the French would be
rather bemused by [Seidmann and Stein's] argument that they could improve their fact-finding by
hearing less from defendants." Id.
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recognizes the right to remain silent. The prosecution's weak evidence
would fail to rebut this testimony and the factfinders would have to
acquit the defendant. For a guilty defendant, lying would be risky
because, once revealed, his lies would virtually guarantee a guilty
verdict. A guilty defendant, however, can remain silent even in the
absence of a privilege against adverse inferences. Weak inculpatory
evidence and the silent defendant's amorphous signal of "guilty
conscience" normally would not amount to a proof beyond all
reasonable doubt.' 0
For these reasons, SSM does not purport to model criminal
defendants with exceedingly high payoffs for lying or for confessing.
For those defendants, the right to silence is essentially irrelevant. SSM
rationalizes the right to silence as a right that can affect the outcome of a
criminal case, and only to the extent that it can actually do so. A
prominent critic of SSM, Professor Stephanos Bibas, therefore has
misidentified his target in describing the model as divorced from the
reality of guilty pleas." The universe of guilty pleas is surely an
important one.
There, a typical defendant faces overwhelming
inculpatory evidence that prompts him to confess and plead guilty. 12
But there is another universe, smaller, but still important: the universe
of not-guilty pleas and denials of accusations.
This universe
accommodates two categories of cases, featuring, respectively, weak
and intermediately-strong inculpatory evidence. Weak-evidence cases
are trivial. Cases in which the prosecution's evidence cuts both ways
and that predominantly go to trial are not trivial.
The right to silence plays a significant role in these non-trivial
cases. These cases exhibit the most acute problem of asymmetrical
information. Factfinders know that some defendants are guilty and
some innocent, but cannot tell who is who. Virtually every defendant
knows whether he committed the crime of which the prosecution
accuses him. This private knowledge, however, does not turn into
public information that factfinders can verify and trust. In the absence
of strong incentives to plead guilty (an attractive plea-bargain offer
could provide those only by sacrificing society's interest in the adequate
punishment of criminals), a guilty defendant will plead not guilty.
Under the regime that allows factfinders to draw adverse inferences
from the defendant's silence, he will also falsely testify about his
innocence. An innocent defendant will do the same, but, of course,
10 Factfmders also may interpret the defendant's silence as a conclusive indication of guilt.
Under this scenario, Bentham's estimation that the right helps only the guilty would be correct.
See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 469-70.
11 See Bibas, supra note 2, at 431-32.
12 But see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2464-65 (2004) (arguing that real-world plea bargains do not track the expected
outcome of the trial).
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without lying. Factfinders consequently will proceed on the assumption
that some self-exonerating accounts are true and some false.
This assumption necessarily reduces the probability of all selfexonerating accounts. As a result, an innocent defendant who cannot
corroborate his exculpatory testimony by credible evidence suffers an
undeserved credibility reduction.
This reduction increases the
probability of the prosecution's case-an increase that helps the
prosecution establish the defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt."
When that happens, factfinders convict an innocent defendant, which
means that, by lying, a guilty defendant imposes a harmful externality
on innocent defendants (and society at large). Bentham's utilitarian
analysis of the right to silence failed to notice the presence of this
externality. 13 Bentham's followers-the present-day abolitionists, who
claim that the right has pernicious effects on the criminal justice system
and therefore must go-have also missed the presence of this harmful
externality.14 Their utilitarian analyses of the right therefore are as
flawed as Bentham's.
The right to silence gives guilty criminals an attractive alternative
to lying. Because a lie can be discovered and because its discovery may
lead to the liar's conviction, for at least some criminals silence would be
a better option. Those criminals would consequently prefer silence to
lying. The externality that they otherwise would impose upon innocents
(the pernicious pooling effect) would thus be eliminated. As a result,
fewer innocents would be convicted than under a regime in which the
right to silence does not exist. This externality-reduction is SSM's
major insight. Based on this insight, the model develops a utilitarian
response to Bentham's followers, who want to abolish the right to
silence on utilitarian grounds.

13 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 457-61.
14 Id. at 455-56.
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The table below summarizes the effects of the right to silence
uncovered by Seidmann and Stein:
INCRIMINATING
EVIDENCE

Weak

Strong
Intermediately Strong

EFFECT OF THE
RIGHT TO SILENCE
No effect: both guilty and innocents
are acquitted.
Some guilty
defendants able to secure their
acquittal without taking the risk of
lying.
No effect: both guilty and innocents
are convicted.
Some guilty defendants remain silent
instead of pooling with innocents.
As a result, more
innocent
defendants are exonerated.

Other supporters of the right to silence have conceded that the right
cannot be justified in consequentialist terms.1 5
Because they
nonetheless support the right and do not want it to be abolished, they
took a deontological route. Specifically, they offered an impressive
catalogue of moral and political values that include "physical
18
privacy,"1 6 "mental privacy,"' 7 "inviolability of cognitive processes,"
"an individual's freedom to resist the government,"' 9 "sanctity of
confession and remorse," 20 an "excuse" from the general duty to
testify, 21 and, finally, the authoritatively affirmed right "not to
experience a cruel trilemma of self-incrimination, perjury or
contempt. '22 According to the right's supporters, these values trump
society's interest in the self-incriminating information that could help it
23
to convict more criminals than it presently does.
15 See id. at 454.

But see Shmuel Leshem, The Effects of the Right to Silence on the

Innocent's Decision to Remain Silent, http://law.bepress.com/alea/18th/art61) (2008) (importantly
expanding SSM by modeling cases with false inculpatory evidence that rationally induces
innocent defendants to remain silent in order to increase the probability of their acquittals).
16 See Vincent Martin Bonventre, An Alternative to the ConstitutionalPrivilege Against SelfIncrimination,49 BROOK. L. REV. 31, 56-59 (1982) (treating the privacy rationale as a plausible
justification for the right to silence); Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination
and PrivatePapers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343, 349-50 (1979) (same); Robert S.
Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 (1970) (same); Erwin N. Griswold, The
Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 216 (1961) (same); Redmayne, supra note 2, at 225-28
(defending the right as a realization of a defendant's political entitlement to disassociate himself
from the prosecution). But see Akhil R. Amar & Ren~e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 890-91 (1995) (arguing that, if
the privacy rationale were sound, the privilege would require equal application in civil
proceedings); Ian Dennis, Instrumental Protection, Human Right or Functional Necessity?
Reassessing the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 342 (1995)
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This defense of the right is flawed. Many people would love to
have their goals and values listed in society's deontological catalogue.
A prospective victim of crime, for example, may argue that her right to
be protected against crime as efficaciously as possible also deserves a
deontological status. To the extent that this claim is plausible, it allows
its holder to demand the abolition of the right to silence. The right's
supporters can surely respond to this claim, but any of their responses
will have a critical vice: it will try to position itself as privileged in
society's moral discourse. To occupy this position, one needs to have
more than just a theory. One needs to have a theory that beats all other
theories.

24

II.

RATIONALISM

Under SSM, innocent defendants have only one rational course of
(questioning the validity of the privacy rationale); David Dolinko, Is There a Rationalefor the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1107-37 (1986) (rejecting the
privacy rationale); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-

Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 311, 317, 319-20 (1991) (casting doubts on the privacy
rationale); William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1234

(1988) ("If the privilege were sensibly designed to protect privacy ..
its application would turn
on the nature of the disclosure the government wished to require, and yet settled fifth amendment
law focuses on the criminal consequences of disclosure.").
17 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Confessing in the Human Voice: A Defense of the PrivilegeAgainst
Self-Incrimination, 7 CARDOZO J. PUB. L., POL'Y, & ETHICS 121 (2008).

18 See Allen & Mace, supra note 2, at 266-89.

19 See Michael S. Green, The Privilege'sLast Stand: The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
and the Right to Rebel Against the State, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 627 (1999) (justifying the right to

silence as an individual's entitlement to rebel against the state); Michael S. Green, The Paradox
of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms, 52 DUKE L.J. 113 (2002).

20 See generally Gerstein, supra note 16 (arguing that the privilege against self-incrimination
protects individual dignity). This idea has roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition in the form of
nemo teneturprodere seipsum (the principle understood by canonist writers to prohibit forcing a
person to accuse himself publicly). See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Law Making and Legislative
Precedent in American Legal History, 33 MINN. L. REV. 103, 118 (1949); AARON
KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 50 (1970); see also LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 433-41 (1968)

(explaining the Judeo-Christian origins of the privilege).
21 See Stuntz, supra note 16.
22 See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); see also Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (entrenching the "trilemma rationale" for the privilege against
self-incrimination).
23 Instead of taking this deontological route, the right's supporters could consequentialize
their positions. They could posit that the values protected by the right to silence must be given a
lexical priority in the ranking of outcomes that the criminal justice system achieves. See
generally Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentializing Moral Theories, 88 PAC. PHIL. QUART. 39

(2007). This line of argumentation, however, would still suffer from petitioprincipii.
24 See Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, andReality: A Rejoinder to Professors

Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983) ("[I]t takes a theory to beat a theory.").
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Guilty
action: revealing their true self-exonerating accounts.
defendants, in contrast, choose between lying, confessing, and
remaining silent. This choice depends on the extent to which each
course of action reduces the expected punishment. When inculpatory
evidence is overwhelmingly strong, all defendants will be convicted
(regardless of factual guilt). Confession therefore might be the optimal
course of action for both guilty and innocent defendants. When the
inculpatory evidence is weak, innocents should tell the truth, while
guilty defendants can choose between silence, or self-exonerating
25
Most
perjury and the risks of conviction arising therefrom.
defendants, if not all of them, will be acquitted (regardless of factual
innocence). The right to silence makes no difference in both scenarios
(except for slightly increasing a guilty defendant's chances of acquittal
26
in cases featuring weak inculpatory evidence).
When the prosecution's evidence is of intermediate strength, an
innocent defendant should still tell the truth, while a guilty defendant's
choice is more complicated. Self-exonerating perjury is a risky option
because of the substantial probability of rebuttal. 27 When a defendant is
proven to have lied in his defense, the jury would virtually certainly
convict him, and he also should expect a harsh sentence from the
judge. 28 All this decreases the defendant's payoff from lying.
Making a confession only makes sense in exchange for a
substantial sentence reduction (or when the defendant's trial expenses
are unaffordably high). When the legal system does not commit itself to
a substantial sentence reduction for confessors, a rational guilty
defendant will be choosing between lying and remaining silent. His
expected benefit from lying will virtually always be greater than the
benefit from confessing: the probability of acquittal generated by the
defendant's self-exonerating lies will bring his expected punishment
below the confessor's standard sentence. The defendant's payoff from
silence will depend on whether factfinders interpret silence as a sign of
guilt.
If they do, the defendant's silence would strengthen the
prosecution's evidence, which would virtually guarantee his conviction.
25 Under one of SSM's simplifying assumptions, jurors infer guilt from silence automatically,
which forces guilty defendants to choose between lying and confessing. Absent an attractive plea
bargain, a guilty defendant therefore would always lie in his defense. He would then be

convicted if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he lied (an unlikely scenario
in weak-evidence cases). Acquittal, therefore, is-and, arguably, should be-the normal weakcase outcome for both innocent and guilty defendants.

See STEIN, supra note 3, at 171-78

(calling for a justification requirement for all guilty verdicts, regardless of factual guilt).
26 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 467-68.
27 At interrogation, a guilty defendant is never aware of all the evidence that the police have
gathered or will gather to rebut his false exonerating story. At trial too, the defendant's right to

discovery does not capture every item of the prosecution's rebuttal evidence. See Seidmann &
Stein, supra note 1, at 491-92. This factor decreases the defendant's expected payoff from lying.
28 See id. at 491-92; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.3 (2004).
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If factfinders draw no adverse inferences from the defendant's silence,
29
the guilty defendant would have a chance of acquittal.
The defendant's choice between lying and remaining silent
consequently depends on whether the law allows factfinders to draw
adverse inferences from silence. If it does, the guilty defendant will
defend himself by lying. If it does not, the defendant will remain silent.
As I already explained, the choice between the two regimes depends on
the legal system's benefits from motivating guilty defendants to prefer
silence to lies.
These benefits derive from the anti-pooling
consequences of the guilty defendants' silence. What determines these
benefits is the extent to which silence substitutes for lies and cleanses
the pool of uncorroborated self-exonerating accounts. An increase in
this substitution increases the credibility of the exculpatory accounts
that remain in the pool.
A number of critics have contended that this theory fails to
consider all rational courses of action that innocent and guilty
defendants may take. Specifically, innocents may rationally prefer
silence to self-exonerating testimony; rational guilty defendants, in turn,
may confess for free and forfeit their chances of acquittal without
securing sentencing discounts in return. For innocent defendants, so
goes the argument, silence may be a better call than making a confused
statement or testimony under pressure and anxiety and leaving a wrong
and potentially devastating impression on the factfinders. 30 For guilty
defendants, an early confession may spare the pressures of interrogation
31
and trial and yield the psychic benefits of contrition and remorse.
This criticism is misguided. Consider a pool of 200 defendants
facing inculpatory evidence of intermediate strength under a regime that
allows factfinders to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's
silence. Half of the defendants in the pool are guilty and half innocent.
For good or bad reasons, half of the innocent defendants wish to remain
silent; the remaining fifty defendants prefer to defend themselves with
true alibis and other exonerating statements.
Half of the guilty
defendants seek contrition and are eager to avoid the pressures of
interrogation and trial. Those defendants make early confessions and
plead guilty. The remaining fifty defendants invoke false alibis and
other self-exonerating statements that imitate the true statements of the
innocents.
Aware of this pooling, and without knowing which
defendant lies and which tells the truth, the factfinders need to evaluate
29 As an alternative, the legal system may abolish the right to silence and impose severe extra
punishments on defendants who choose to lie. This measure need not be discussed here. For
reasons supporting its rejection, see Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 440, n.36.
30 See Buell, supra note 2, at 1639; Waters, supra note 2, at 611-12; Van Kessel, supra note
2, at 944. For a special case in which silence really can help an innocent defendant, see Leshem,
supra, note 15.
31 See Bibas, supra note 2, at 424.
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the credibility of uncorroborated, self-exonerating testimony of Doe, a
randomly chosen defendant.
The probability of Doe's testimony being true equals p12, with p
representing the probability of truthfulness that would attach to an
innocent defendant's testimony in the absence of pooling. If guilty
defendants did not pool with the innocents at all-that is, if only
innocent defendants were to come up with self-exonerating testimonies
and their guilty counterparts were to plead guilty or stay silent-this
probability would equal 1. The probability of Doe's testimony being
true consequently equals 0.5. Hence, if Doe is factually guilty, his false
story would undeservedly get a probability boost of 0.5. And if Doe is
factually innocent, the probability of his true, but uncorroborated, story
would be wrongly discounted by 0.5. The factfinders subsequently will
update their assessment of Doe's testimony by considering the
inculpatory evidence. The probability of guilt to which this evidence
gives rise will further reduce the probability of Doe's innocence.
Because the inculpatory evidence has intermediate strength, this
reduction may take the probability of Doe's innocence to below a
"reasonable doubt." Doe's guilt will thus be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The factfinders may consequently convict Doe-a
defendant equally likely to be guilty and innocent.
The right to silence would give a choice to the fifty guilty
defendants who felt compelled to testify falsely in their defense. Each
of those defendants exposed his testimony to the risk of rebuttal.
Rebuttal of the defendant's testimony virtually guaranteed his
conviction. The right to silence removes this risk from a guilty
defendant who is unwilling to confess and who otherwise would lie in
an effort to obtain an acquittal. For such defendants, silence constitutes
an attractive way of blocking an increase in the probability of
conviction. Lying becomes less attractive than previously because a
defendant can eliminate the prospect of rebuttal by remaining silent. A
guilty defendant therefore would try to develop a false self-exonerating
story only when it brings about a better prospect of acquittal than
silence. 32 To achieve this result, he must have at his disposal a false,
but convincing, alibi witness or similar testimony. As in real life, the
guilty defendants in my example do not normally have such persuasive
exculpatory evidence. These defendants-say, 25 out of 50-"take the
Fifth" and separate from the pool.
This separation reduces the pool's size to 75 self-exonerating
accounts. As previously, 50 of those accounts are true, but the number
of false exculpatory stories is now 25, instead of 50. Under these
conditions, the probability of Doe's testimony being true equals 2/3.
32 1 ignore the possibility of risk-aversion. Accounting for it would not change the essence of
my argument.
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This probability virtually guarantees Doe's acquittal because the
inculpatory evidence would hardly take it down to below a "reasonable
doubt." The legal system consequently would acquit each of the
testifying innocents. The price paid for achieving this result would be
the acquittal of the guilty criminals, who now benefit from silence, but
would have implicated themselves by unsuccessful lies under the
previous regime. The legal system, of course, needs to figure out
whether it wants to pay this price. 33 SSM offers no normative
prescriptions as to whether it should do so. 34 This model only advises
on how to get most out of this price, given the system's willingness to
pay it.

I now turn to the remaining groups of defendants: "pressurized
innocents" and "remorseful criminals." For a truly pressurized innocent
defendant, speaking out the truth is-subjectively-almost as dangerous
as lying. For that reason, presumably, he prefers silence to giving a true
self-exonerating testimony. A regime that allows factfinders to draw
inferences against silent defendants might change this preference
because silence is no longer costless. This change is socially beneficial
because of the anticipated increase in the flow of the true claims of
innocence that-objectively-are difficult to rebut. Relative to the
current regime, the level of anxiety among testifying innocents would
increase exponentially, but the rate of rightful acquittals would increase
as well. This beneficial effect, however, would likely be offset by the
deleterious pooling of the guilty and the innocent, as described above.
Hence, the plight of pressurized innocent defendants has no strong
implications on whether the right to silence should stay or go. The need
to protect such defendants can neither rationalize the right nor justify its
35
abolition.
For a remorseful criminal, the right to silence is altogether
immaterial. When a criminal genuinely seeks the psychic benefits of
remorse, he will go ahead and confess to the crime. Whether he can
remain silent without risking adverse inferences is not a factor that can
play a role in this decision. To be sure, if most guilty defendants were
remorseful, their confessions would separate them from the innocents,
33 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 470-74 (explaining SSM's dependency on the
predetermined societal preferences between erroneous convictions and erroneous acquittals).
34 Laudan, supra note 2, at 130, criticized SSM for its excessive protection of the innocent.
This critique misses its target, as Seidmann and Stein only articulate society's choices and the
choices' consequences. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 473-74. They take no position as
to what choices society should actually make. A proper target for Laudan's critique could be my
self-authored theory of evidence, see STEIN, supra note 3, at 172-83, which favors a very strong
protection against wrongful conviction. My disagreement with Professor Laudan, however, is not
part of this Article's agenda.
35 As noted in Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 455 n.82, "[t]he existence of silent
innocents does not enter into our model, in which guilty defendants separate from testifying
innocents by exercising the right to silence."
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and the pooling effect that the right to silence seeks to reduce would be
insignificant.
But most criminal defendants are not remorseful and virtually
never confess for free. 36 Ordinarily, the legal system can only purchase
a confession by giving the confessor an attractive sentencing discount.
A rational defendant will confess for free only after finding the
Avoiding trial in such
inculpatory evidence incontrovertible.
circumstances will often be the defendant's best strategy even when he
does not stand to receive a sentencing discount. A hopeless trial has a
downside: criminal defense costs money and effort. Furthermore,
finding out that the defendant wasted her time may prompt the
sentencing judge to waste the defendant's time in return.
But for some guilty defendants, the prospect of going to trial is
attractive. This is the case with defendants who face inculpatory
evidence that is not overwhelmingly strong. For these defendants,
confession is not an option. These guilty defendants consequently
Under Seidmann and Stein's
choose between silence and lies.
taxonomy, these defendants choose between pooling with and
separating from the innocents. The number of defendants facing this
choice is an empirical matter that has not been completely resolved.
This number determines the practical significance of the right to silence
as an anti-pooling device.
Another rationalist critique of SSM holds that the model is doomed
to unravel. After learning about the credit that self-exonerating
statements receive from factfinders following the criminals' separation
from the pool, some criminals will try to get back to the pool by
concocting false alibis and other self-exonerating perjuries. Factfinders
will learn about the pool's renewed contamination and will start
discounting the probability of all self-exonerating stories that come
37
uncorroborated.
This critique does not properly account for a guilty criminal's cost
of lying. As already explained, any false self-exonerating statement or
testimony carries the risk of being refuted. This risk increases the
probability of the defendant's conviction. A rational guilty defendant
determines his defense strategy by comparing the expected payoffs from
confessing, lying and remaining silent. When the sentence discount for
36 Cf. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from
Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REv. 327, 329, 331, 364-67 (1998). Bibas, supra note 2, at 424 n.16,
cites this article to support the idea that confessing criminals achieve psychic benefits, such as
'"forgiveness, reconciliation, and a clear conscience' as well as peace, joy, and redemption."
Unfortunately, neither he nor Cochran demonstrated empirically that many criminals actually
seek those benefits. My experience as a criminal attorney has been rather limited: the only such
criminal I am familiar with is Rodion Raskolnikov, the fictional protagonist of FYODOR N.
DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1866) (Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 2000) (1866).
37 See SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 68.
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confessing defendants is substantial, the defendant may decide to
confess and plead guilty. Absent such a discount, he will be choosing
between the expected payoffs from silence, on the one hand, and from
lies, on the other. The right to silence minimizes the defendant's
negative payoff from silence without changing the negative payoff from
lies. The right consequently widens the gap between the two negative
payoffs, relative to a legal regime that recognizes no right to silence.
For those guilty defendants who choose to lie when the right to
silence is at their disposal, the expected payoff from lying must be
greater than the payoff from silence. Both payoffs are determined by
the defendant's probability of being acquitted. If the extra-credit for
self-exonerating testimony is set high, guilty defendants would often
prefer lies over silence. But this extra credit need not be set high. To
secure the exoneration of innocent defendants, it need not be greater
than a reasonable doubt. The "back to the pool" strategy therefore
would be attractive only to those guilty criminals whose gain from
lying-the probability of acquittal generated by a false self-exonerating
testimony-is sufficiently high. The "back to the pool" strategy thus
would be used predominantly by criminals with iron-clad alibis (or
other convincing exculpatory accounts). Criminals with weaker stories
would not assume the risk of being uncovered as liars. Defendants
willing to take this risk therefore are predominantly those who would
pool with innocents under any regime.
Another line of critique against SSM holds that the prohibition of
adverse inferences from silence requires factfinders to "treat testifiers
and nontestifiers alike."'38 To satisfy this requirement, factfinders must
ascribe the same a priori probability of innocence to silent and testifying
defendants. 39
Testimonies of potentially innocent defendants
consequently will not receive the extra credit that they need to receive
under SSM. And when testifying innocent defendants receive no
signaling advantage, the model unravels.40
This argument proceeds from a false doctrinal premise. The right
to silence does not require factfinders to treat testifiers and nontestifiers
alike. It requires that factfinders draw no inferences of guilt from a
defendant's silence. The right does not enjoin factfinders from upping
the probability of innocence of a testifying defendant. This credit
brings about no inferences of guilt for defendants who chose to exercise
their Fifth Amendment right. Those defendants, of course, would not
be as well-positioned as testifiers, but there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that dictates an alignment between the two groups of
defendants.
38 Id.
39 Id.

40 Id.
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REALISM

Are CriminalDefendants Rational?

Does it all happen in the real world? I claim that it does, but can
only offer inconclusive evidence in support of this empirical claim.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that criminal suspects and defendants
tend to respond rationally to the presence or absence of the right to
silence at interrogation and trial. The factfinders' authorization to draw
adverse inferences from silence, introduced by the English law in 1994,
has reduced the percentage of silent suspects and defendants without
increasing the rate of confessions. After finding silence no longer
attractive, guilty suspects and defendants chose to lie instead of
confessing. This evidence, however, is incomplete. More generally,
empirical evidence demonstrates-once again, inconclusively-that
suspects and defendants tend to act rationally in making important
4
choices that the legal system allows them to make. '
My primary evidentiary source is an empirical study of Tom
Bucke, Robert Street and David Brown that was commissioned by the
British government following the removal of the bar against adverse
inferences from silence. 42 This study examined interrogations of 1,227
suspects and reported that 6% of the suspects did not answer any
questions, as compared to 10% before the abolition of the right to
silence in 1994; and that an additional 10% of the suspects did not
answer some questions, as compared to 13% under the right to silence.
These findings establish that the abolition of the right to silence reduced
the percentage of silent suspects and defendants. Another important
finding is a roughly similar confession rate under both regimes, which
the study explains as follows:
[W]hile suspects may be talking more to officers during police
questioning, it would appear that they are no more likely to make
admissions than in the past.
Some officers
described this
43
development as an increase in 'the flannel factor.'
These findings suggest that the abolition of the right to silence in
England and Wales induced many guilty suspects to switch from silence
to self-exonerating lies. As predicted by SSM, abolition of the right did
not increase the rate of confessions. Instead, it intensified the pooling
of the guilty and the innocent.
The Bucke-Street-Brown study relies on bivariate correlations,

41 This evidence is surveyed in Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 498-502.
42 See BUCKE ET AL., supra note 7, at 30-35.
43 Id. at 34-35.

1130

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

which means that the increase in exculpatory statements may have been
induced by factors unrelated to the right's abolition. This hypothesis,
however, can be ruled out as implausible because in the early nineties,
prior to the right's abolition in 1994, the proportion of silent suspects
had steadily increased, presumably because many criminal attorneys
advised clients to remain silent. 44 This baseline factor suggests that the
right's abolition prompted attorneys to tell clients that silence is no
longer attractive. As a result, many guilty defendants opted for lies as
the only viable alternative to confessing. Hence, criminal defendants
rationally chose between lies, silence and confessions.
Two extensive studies of interrogations of suspects in the United
States also support the "rational defendant" hypothesis. These studies
report that the rate of suspects opting for silence at interrogation range
between 10% and 20%. 45 Those suspects received the Miranda
warnings and were given access to attorneys. If those attorneys or the
suspects themselves estimated that factfinders in their future trials could
somehow infer guilt from silence, the rate of silent suspects would have
46
been much lower than twenty or even ten percent.
The "rational defendant" hypothesis is substantiated by studies
covering other areas of the criminal process. These studies establish
that semi-indigent defendants rationally prefer to retain an expensive
private attorney over having a defense counsel appointed at the
government's expense 47 and that many indigent defendants choose to
represent themselves with adequate rates of success, instead of being
represented by public defenders. 48 Furthermore, defendants by and
large rationally prefer a jury trial over a trial by a judge, and vice
49
versa.
SSM's realist critics do not seem to be impressed by this evidence.
44 Id. at 24-25; see also DAVID BROWN, PACE TEN YEARS ON: A REVIEW OF THE
RESEARCH 172-75 (HOME OFFICE RESEARCH AND STATISTICS DIRECTORATE 1997).

45 See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 869 tbl.4 (1996) (reporting that 9.5% of
Mirandized suspects invoked their right to remain silent during police interrogations); Richard A.
Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 275 tbl.2 (1996)
(finding that 20.88% of questioned suspects invoked the right to silence, with 19.78% invoking
the right at the outset of their interrogation).
46 Note that the 10% average is actually a high figure because numerous suspects are caught
red-handed or apprehended on the basis of overwhelming inculpatory evidence. For those
hopeless suspects, confession is the best call. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 461-62.

Those suspects are not part of the pool that SSM separates.
47 See Morris B. Hoffman, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, An Empirical Study of
Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the "MarginallyIndigent, " 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 223 (2005).
48 See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 461 (2007); Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical
Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423 (2007).
49 See Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1495, 1550 (2006).
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They claim that suspects and defendants do not typically make rational
choices at their interrogations or even at trials. 50 This claim, however,
was tendered as a general observation that rested on the critics' intuition
and, perhaps, individual experience as practitioners. None of the critics
has relied on empirical evidence that could substantiate his "irrational
defendant" hypothesis.
My response to those critics is straightforward. Economic logic
substantiated by some empirical proof is methodologically superior to
personal intuitions with no external empirical support whatsoever. For
me, "methodologically superior" means "more persuasive," but this
sameness derives from a set of methodological commitments 5' that
SSM's critics need not endorse. The critics, however, need to have
some methodological commitments to make their claims meaningful.
Alas, they uniformly failed to indicate what those commitments are.
B.

Are FactfindersRational?

Professor Gordon Van Kessel argued that when factfinders give an
extra credit to a defendant's uncorroborated self-exonerating testimony,
they become more inclined to draw adverse inferences against silent
defendants despite the Fifth Amendment's proscription of such
inferences. 52 If so, a potentially silent criminal would be induced to
pool with innocents by concocting a false self-exonerating account.
This renewed pooling would motivate factfinders to discount the
credibility of all self-exonerating accounts that have no corroboration.
Consequently, SSM would unravel.5 3 This point derives in large part
from Van Kessel's general skepticism about jurors' ability to reason
54
economically and emulate market behavior.
Relatedly, Professor Louis Michael Seidman criticizes SSM by
reference to the model's unrealistic operational demands. He describes
Seidmann and Stein's theory as "republican"; 55 comments that the
theory's "very brilliance.., strongly cuts against it" because Seidmann
and Stein "require seventy-nine pages of the HarvardLaw Review to set
out their complex and tightly reasoned theory"; and asks rhetorically
"How likely it is that ordinary jurors, who do not regularly read the
50 See Bibas, supra note 2, at 421-22; Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 935-36; ROBERTS &
ZUCKERMAN, supra note 2, at 422-25.
51 These commitments are specified in Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 436-38.

52 See Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 942-43. I focus here on the main points of Professor Van
Kessel's critique of SSM. His independent insights and points of agreement with Seidmann and

Stein are not discussed in this Article.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 953-60; see also Buell, supra note 2, at 1639.
55 See SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 64, 69.
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HarvardLaw Review, will think up or understand the theory." 56
I respond to Louis Seidman's argument first. This argument
implies that jurors need to know the reasons underlying the rules that
they are instructed to apply. These reasons include the social policies
that the rules promote and the incentive-based mechanisms that they
employ in promoting those policies. Without knowing those reasons, so
goes the argument, jurors would not be able to apply the rules properly.
This proposition strikes me as wrong. An adequate juror need not
have a law school education. Common sense and a willingness to make
his or her best effort in following the judge's instructions should be
enough. A juror, in other words, must assume that the rule that she is
instructed to apply promotes social good. Awareness of the good's
nature may help the juror make her decision, but the juror need not
know, for example, how the incentives set by the rule play out to attain
57
that good. A juror, in other words, must follow rules qua rules.
For these reasons, it seems to me that Louis Seidman intended to
make a different (more sophisticated) point, similar to Van Kessel's. I
now restate this point in a format that captures the claims of both
scholars. Arguably, jurors act upon natural epistemic instincts that form
their "common sense." A rule that prohibits adverse inferences from
silence and the credit that a defendant's self-exonerating testimony
receives under SSM run against those instincts. Because jurors are
essentially free to decide the case as they deem fit, the legal system
cannot simply tell them "hold your instincts back and follow the rules
qua rules." This sort of command is not something that jurors are likely
to obey blindly. Jurors need to have good and intelligible reasons for
overriding their natural instincts. Under this criterion, SSM admittedly
does not score high. This model is too complex for an average juror to
understand and agree with reflectively.
This point has some plausibility, but in the end it fails to persuade.
Do jurors reflectively agree with all the rules they apply? Do they
agree, for example, with the rule against perpetuities, with felony
murder, or, closer to the subject of the present discussion, with the rule
that requires them to acquit a seemingly guilty defendant in the face of a
reasonable doubt? I am not aware of any empirical research that
answers these questions. Unfortunately, nor are Professors Seidman
and Van Kessel, whose descriptions of jurors' deliberations are tendered
as a "word of mouth" without any empirical support.
SSM assumes that jurors are both able and willing to promote the
objectives of the law. This assumption is far from being divorced from
reality. SSM further assumes that, when a judge instructs jurors to
56 Id. at 68.
57 See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991).
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follow a particular legal rule in order to promote the law's objectives,
the jurors will follow the instruction. Before becoming a juror, a person
is told how crucial following those instructions is; her task as a juror is
also described to her as a civic duty that she must perform
conscientiously in order to promote society's good. She is told, in other
words, that the law's rules are the reasons for her decisions as a juror,
and that these reasons should preempt her private convictions and
intuitions.

The juror is also told that following these authoritative

reasons instead of hers is to society's benefit. For an ordinary person,
whose daily routine does not include work as a law professor on the
normative side of the law, this following of rules qua rules is a both

acceptable and feasible way of performing her tasks as a juror.
Seidman's and Van Kessel's hypothesis that jurors adequately apply
only those rules that align with their personal intuitions is
counterintuitive. Those who rely on this hypothesis in order to establish
that the law does not work as it is supposed to work must prove it
58
empirically. Bald assertions will not do.

IV.

POSITIVE LAW

One of SSM' s most attractive features is its explanatory value-a
contribution to understanding positive law. The model's "lies as
externality" rationale explains and justifies virtually every aspect of the
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 59 This rationale explains why the right
to silence applies to testimonial, as opposed to physical, evidence and to
60
criminal, as opposed to civil and other non-criminal, proceedings.
This rationale also justifies the same-sovereign limitation of the selfincrimination privilege, 6 1 the privilege's extension to sentencing
63
proceedings, 62 and the booking and emergency exceptions to Miranda.
58 Samuel Buell, supra note 2, at 1639, estimates that factfinders evaluate defendants'
testimony without using the background knowledge as to how defendants, guilty and innocent,
respond to accusations. Instead, factfinders evaluate each testimony on its own individual merits.
But where do factfinders take those "merits" from when the testimony is not corroborated? And
how can one ever start evaluating evidence without resorting to generalizations? See STEIN,
supra note 3, at 92-100 (demonstrating that the use of generalizations in adjudicative factfmding
is pervasive and inevitable).
59 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 474-98.
60 Id. at 475-80, 484-88.
61 Id. at 482-84.
62 Id. at 495-98.
63 1 discuss those exceptions only in this footnote. Under the emergency exception to
Miranda, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), a self-incriminating statement that the
police obtain from a suspect while attending an ongoing emergency is admissible as evidence at
the suspect's criminal trial even when no Miranda warnings are given. This exception is best
explained by the anti-pooling rationale. Statements made admissible under this exception are
inculpatory. As such, they never pool with self-exonerating accounts of innocent defendants.
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No other theory has provided a coherent unifying rationale for these
rules. 64
Consider the testimonial/physical evidence distinction first. The
Fifth Amendment privilege protects suspects and defendants only
against the compelled production of testimonial evidence. 65 There is no
rule prohibiting factfinders to draw adverse inferences from a
defendant's refusal to provide physical evidence. 66 This distinction and
its official "trilemma" rationale are problematic. Both production and a
refusal to produce physical evidence are communicative conducts
functionally equivalent to testimony. As such, they call for protection
by the self-incrimination privilege. However, a decision to protect all
such conducts by the privilege would make the privilege too broad. At
the same time, a decision to confine the privilege's protection to verbal
communications would make it too narrow. Under the "trilemma"
rationale, the government must not force a person into choosing
between self-incrimination, perjury and penalties for contempt. This
trilemma, arguably, is too cruel to be tolerated. But if any such
trilemma is socially intolerable, the privilege should then extend to all
compelled communications, verbal and non-verbal alike. And if only
some of such trilemmas are intolerable, while others are tolerable, what
are the criteria by which to distinguish between permissible and
impermissible trilemmas? What is so special about compelled verbal
communications that makes them so intolerable?
Why tolerate
compelled non-verbal communications?
rationale. 67
"trilemma"
the
unravel
questions
These
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has gradually eroded the distinction
between testimonial and physical evidence and replaced it with a
Other rationales for the right to silence cannot explain this exception so straightforwardly. Under

the booking exception, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), a suspect's answers to
routine booking questions concerning his name, age, address and other biographical data are not
protected by Mirandaeven when they might incriminate the suspect. The anti-pooling rationale
justifies this exception straightforwardly: guilty suspects are unable to provide booking

information that imitates non-verifiable personal data of innocent defendants. Other rationales for
the right to silence once again fail to provide a straightforward explanation to this exception.
64 For the most recent attempt, see Michael Pardo, Self-Incriminationand the Epistemology of
Testimony, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1023 (2008) (rationalizing the right to silence as preventing the

government's utilization of the defendant's "epistemic authority" as a witness). This rationale
fails to explain United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
protection does not extend to cases in which a person is forced to reveal information
incriminating him abroad), and Baxter v. Palmigiano,425 U.S. 308 (1976) (holding that the Fifth

Amendment privilege against adverse inferences from silence does not apply in non-criminal
cases).

65 See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,
210(1988).

66 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245, 252 (1910).
67 See SUSAN EASTON, THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 207-35 (2d ed. 1998); Pardo,

supra note 64.
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complex doctrine. Under this doctrine, the Fifth Amendment's
protection against governmental compulsion extends to all verbal and
some non-verbal communications. 68 For example, the "act of
production" rule holds that preexisting documents do not count as
"testimonial"; yet the compelled production of documents classifies as
"testimonial" to the extent it entails the producer's admission that the
documents exist, that they are in his possession or control and are
authentic. 69 The act of production consequently counts as testimonial
evidence that ought to be protected from disclosure by "use
immunity. '70 Hence, although the government can require a person to
produce an identified tax-related document that might incriminate that
person,7' it cannot require a person to assemble a number of unspecified
documents pertaining to its investigation.72 The first of those
requirements was analogized by the Supreme Court to forcing a person
"to surrender the key to a strongbox"-an action not meriting protection
by the Fifth Amendment's use immunity. 73 The second requirement,
according to the Court, is similar to compelling a person to "[tell] an
inquisitor the combination to a wall safe"--a compulsion that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits.74 SSM rationalizes these decisions by the
presence of a pooling externality in the second category of cases and by
its absence in the first category.75 In the first category of cases, the
government need not rely on the truthtelling of the person subpoenaed
to produce a named document. In the second category, it does rely on
that truthtelling.76 This reliance allows guilty criminals to create a
pooling externality by falsely imitating innocent suspects. 77 There is no
need to restate here this argument's details. 78 All that needs to be
noticed is that the "trilemma" rationale no longer functions as the
organizing principle of the Fifth Amendment's right to silence. The
right to silence is in need of a new unifying rationale.
Among the existing rationales, SSM's anti-pooling rationalization
is, arguably, the best. Under SSM, the Fifth Amendment privilege
applies only when the pooling-by-lying alternative is available to a
guilty suspect. When a guilty suspect is required to provide externalityladen evidence that can reduce the credibility of an innocent suspect's
68 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 475.
69 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 n.l 1 (1984) (citing In re Grand Jury Empanelled
March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1981)).

70 Id.at 616.
71 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
72 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
73 Id.at 43.
74 Id.
75 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 477-80.
76 Id.at 479-80.
77 Id.at 480.
78 For those details, see id.at 475-81.
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Any such externality-laden

evidence-and this evidence alone-would classify as "testimonial" for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.

Utterances and their non-verbal

equivalents-for example, sign language and a person's nodding of her
head for a "yes"-obviously fall into the "testimonial" category. But
evidence would also classify as "testimonial" in any case in which its
producer can shape its content. This shaping ability makes the evidence
externality-laden. For example, a handwriting sample that a suspect
produces at the police station is "testimonial" because a guilty suspect
might replicate an innocent person's handwriting. 79
Giving a
handwriting sample is an activity always accompanied with an explicit
or implicit confirmation "This is my handwriting." This confirmation is
a communication that originates from the suspect's mental process.
Crucially for our purposes, this confirmation can be false and
externality-laden.
For that reason, courts should classify it as
"testimonial. '8 0 By contrast, handwriting samples that already exist
classify as physical evidence because their production does not depend
on the person's confirmation; 81 a qualified expert or a nonexpert witness
personally familiar with the person's handwriting can authenticate such
82
samples.
In a civil case, a person may invoke the self-incrimination privilege
only as an exemption from punishment for contempt. She has no
privilege against adverse inferences from silence. 83 As the Supreme
Court held in Baxter v. Palmigiano, the Fifth Amendment does not
forbid "adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they
refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against
them. '84 This rule has been applied widely across the United States 85
79 The Supreme Court is yet to recognize it, though. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
266-67 (1967); Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 477.
80 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 476-77.
81 Id.
82 See FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(2).
83 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
84 Id. at 318.
85 See, e.g., LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 1997); FDIC v. Fid. &
Deposit Co. of Md., 45 F.3d 969, 977 (5th Cir. 1995); Koester v. Am. Republic Invs., Inc., 11
F.3d 818, 823-24 (8th Cir. 1993); Daniels v. Pipefitters' Ass'n Local Union No. 597, 983 F.2d
800, 802 (7th Cir. 1993); RAD Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 808 F.2d 271, 274-75, 277
(3d Cir. 1986); Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1983); Hoover v.
Knight, 678 F.2d 578, 581-82 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1286-87
(5th Cir. 1979); see also Nat'l Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 929-32 (7th
Cir. 1983) ("After Baxter there is no longer any doubt that at trial a civil defendant's silence may
be used against him, even if that silence is an exercise of his constitutional privilege against selfincrimination."). For a summary of the controlling principle, see Lasalle Bank Lake View v.
Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 389-92 (7th Cit. 1995), which held that, although the circuit courts of
appeals have widely recognized the rule allowing the factfinder to draw adverse inferences from
Fifth Amendment silence in civil proceedings, even in a civil case a summary judgment imposing
liability cannot rest solely on an assertion of the privilege. Id. at 394; see also SEC v. Colello,
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(although there are a few states that refuse to follow it).86
This rule is difficult to reconcile with the trilemma rationale (and
other non-economic justifications of the privilege). 87 Even in a civil
case, the factfinders' authorization to draw adverse inferences against a
party invoking the self-incrimination privilege is a form of compulsion
authorized by the state. This compulsion forces the party into a choice
between incriminating himself, committing perjury, or staying silent
and assuming a serious risk of losing the case. There is no difference in
kind between this compulsion and the "cruel trilemma."
SSM justifies the right to silence as a means for preventing
wrongful convictions only. As such, it provides a straightforward
explanation to the Baxter rule. The pooling problem that the selfincrimination privilege seeks to attenuate does not exist in civil and
other non-criminal proceedings because those proceedings do not
involve innocents who face the possibility of wrongful conviction. The
unavailability of the privilege motivates liars to pool with truth-tellers in
those proceedings as well, but this pooling occurs outside the machinery
of criminal justice. The legal system consequently need not sacrifice
probative evidence in order to prevent it.
In United States v. Balsys, the Supreme Court held that a suspect's
prospect of being prosecuted for a crime in a foreign country does not
activate the Fifth Amendment protection. 88 This holding confined the
privilege against self-incrimination to same-sovereign prosecutions. As
the Court previously acknowledged in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission, a witness in a state proceeding can invoke the privilege
out of concern regarding a potential federal prosecution, and vice
versa. 89 By the same token, a witness in a state proceeding can
successfully claim the privilege by referring to a prosecution in another
state. 90

This same-sovereign limitation is at odds with the trilemma and all
other rationales for the privilege. A defendant's prospect of being
convicted and punished abroad, rather than in the United States, does
not lighten the trilemma experience guarded against by the Fifth
139 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment against a defendant when
there was some evidence in addition to an adverse inference from silence). The Baxter principle
also applies in clemency proceedings. See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S.
272, 285-88 (1998).
86 The Baxter principle does not apply in states that have adopted Uniform Rule of Evidence
512 (an equivalent of the proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513, so far rejected by Congress).
Uniform Rule 512 provides that no adverse inferences may be drawn from an invocation of any
legally recognized privilege.
87 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 485.
88 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
89 378 U.S. 52, 79-80 (1964).
90 See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 671-72 (indicating unequivocally that Murphy applies uniformly in
the United States).
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Amendment. The same "cruel trilemma" is present.
The anti-pooling rationale resolves this difficulty. The samesovereign limitation generates no pernicious pooling inside the
American criminal justice system. When a criminal tried in another
country chooses to lie, his lies do not increase the risk of wrongful
conviction for innocent defendants in the United States. The externality
that his lies generate stays overseas and therefore need not be eliminated
by the costly Fifth Amendment.
The same-sovereign limitation
generates probative evidence for proceedings taking place in the United
States, such as Balsys's deportation case. There is no good economic
reason to forego this benefit in order to protect foreign innocents.
Those innocents must be taken care of by their own legal systems. 9 1
In Mitchell v. United States, the Supreme Court held that, after
pleading guilty, a defendant can invoke the privilege against selfincrimination in her sentencing hearing. 92 The Court rejected the
notions that incrimination is complete once guilt was adjudicated and
that a defendant waives the privilege by pleading guilty. 93 The Court
consequently declared that a sentencing court may not draw an adverse
inference from a defendant's silence when it determines sentencing
94
facts that relate to the circumstances of the crime.
The trilemma rationale cannot easily justify this decision. After
pleading guilty, a defendant cannot seriously complain about being
forced by the government into the cruel trilemma of self-incrimination,
perjury or contempt. The anti-pooling rationale, by contrast, easily
justifies Mitchell. Failure to apply the right to silence in sentencing
hearings would induce some defendants, if not many, to plead not guilty
instead of guilty. These defendants would then either remain silent and
enjoy the pre-conviction protection against adverse inferences or falsely
testify to their innocence and adversely affect innocent defendants by
impugning the credibility of their truthful testimony.
Society,
consequently, can gain nothing and will likely lose from not extending
the Fifth Amendment protection to sentencing hearings. 95
These doctrinal rationalizations are not the only ones that SSM
generates. As indicated above, SSM explains every important aspect of
the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 96 In this explanatory capacity,
91 As acknowledged in Balsys, 524 U.S. at 698-99, an applicable international norm that
provided for cooperative law enforcement between the United States and the foreign country
might alter this conclusion. An international norm that demanded uniform observance of the selfincrimination privilege would have a similar result. But absent such special rules, the samesovereign limitation to the privilege should remain intact. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at
483.
92 526 U.S. 314 (1999).
93 Id. at 325-26.
94 Id. at 327-28.
95 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1,at 497-98.
96 I do not discuss here the rule permitting factfmders to draw adverse inferences from the
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SSM outscores all other justifications of the right to silence. 97
This explanatory advantage of the model has escaped the attention
of its critics. What could possibly be the reasons underlying the critics'
refusal to take Seidmann and Stein's rationalization of positive law
seriously? I can only think of one such reason: as an empirical matter,
the anti-pooling rationale was not among the explicit motivations of the
Fifth Amendment's architects. But why should it matter? The selfincrimination privilege is a highly complex and untidy legal doctrine
that has been developed over years by multiple actors, predominantly by
common law judges. Many considerations have gone into the mix, and
not all of them were explicit and comprehensive.
If so, why inquire empirically into the elusive historical intentions
of the doctrine's multiple architects? 98 Why not ask a different-partly
normative and partly hermeneutical--question: What contemporary
reasons present the Fifth Amendment doctrine in its best light? Indeed,
what is the most plausible explanation of the doctrine's retention and
remarkable resilience? After all, the doctrine has survived a number of
abolitionist attempts, 99 and this survival must have a rationale of its
own. The anti-pooling theory of Seidmann and Stein offers the best
available rationale. Those who disagree with this claim must offer a
better rationalization for the doctrine's continual survival.

CONCLUSION

Critics of Seidmann and Stein's theory miss an important aspect of
the right to silence. This right plays virtually no role in cases in which
the prosecution's evidence is overwhelmingly strong or weak. The right
to silence affects only those cases in which inculpatory evidence has
intermediate strength. For those nontrivial cases that often go to trial,
the right is significant as an anti-pooling device that helps factfinders to
separate the innocent from the guilty.
The critics argue that the anti-pooling device does not work in the
real world in which irrational defendants are adjudicated by boundedly
rational jurors. This argument, however, is tendered without evidence.
defendant's pre-arrest silence. The anti-pooling rationale justifies this rule as well: see id. at 48889.
97 Id. at 474-75.
98 See Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A
PhilosophicalDefense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 349-56 (2007)
(demonstrating that explanatory accounts of common law rules as producing economic efficiency
need not match the reasons by which judges justify their decisions, as it is enough for those
accounts to uncover contextual convergence between judges' decisions and efficiency).
99 For the most recent attempt, see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (declaring
unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994), an attempt by Congress to abolish Miranda).
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It also ignores substantial empirical research demonstrating that
criminal defendants manage their affairs rationally. Most crucially, this
argument fails to explain empirical evidence gathered in Great Britain.
According to this evidence, abolition of the right to silence that took
place in 1994 had caused many guilty criminals to switch from silence
to self-exonerating lies (as opposed to confessions).
Furthermore, the critics of Seidmann and Stein pay virtually no
attention to positive law. They disengage from the Supreme Court's
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, which Seidmann and Stein's theory
rationalizes. To counter this theory, its critics need to furnish an
alternative explanation of the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. But the
critics do not even try to develop such an explanation. They attempt to
defeat Seidmann and Stein's theory without offering a theory of their
own. No wonder they fail.

